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The economies of East and Southeast Asia have carried out pro­
found and in many cases highly successful transformations over the 
past quarter-century. The prospect for dynamic economic growth and 
trade in the Asian-Pacific region is a fundamental force, with major 
implications for each of the nations in the region and its economic 
,,relations with others. 
The purpose here is to survey the sequential pattern of Asian­
Pacific economic development and growth; the extent and patterns of 
trade expansion, and the comcomitant heightened degree of economic 
interdependence, regionally and globally; the problems, policy issues, 
and opportunities these economic forces have brought on; and finally 
certain implications for China-United States economic relations. These 
themes can only be stated broadly, without substantial elaboration. 
Important political factors-such as the evolution from bipolar 
US-USSR confli~t to more complex multipolar relationships, the evolu­
tion.of China-US relations, the ongoing importance of the Japan-US 
alliance, and decolonialization and the rise of many new independent 
nations---are excluded from explici•t consideration although they have 
been of some significance in shaping economic relationships. Similarly, 
I do not consider the effects of the basic forces of economic change 
upon political-security relationships. The main focus is thus upon 
the trading relationships among the economies of the region. 
Two factors are cent.ral to our understanding of the economic forces 
at work: the large and increasing degree·of interdependence among 
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the econo~ies1 of the Asian-Pacific region; and the great heterogeneity 
among these economies. The region is defined mainly in terms of large 
trading relationships among its constituent economies, absolutely 
and/or relatively. For this reason I consider here a broader Asian­
Pacific group of economies including not only East and Southeast Asia, 
but also Oceania (notably Australia), the United States and Canada, 
·2 
and the USSR. Moreover, intra-regional economic relationships must 
always be viewed in the cont~xt of a global system of relatively free, open, 
multilateral trade, payments, capital, and technology flows among the 
market economies. Basic data on the Asian-Pacific economies, their 
trade performances and structures, and amounts of trade with each 
other and the rest of the world are provided in Tables 1-5. 
These data suggest the immense heterogeneity among the economies 
of the Asia-Pacific region. They differ by type of economic system 
(market-oriented, capitalist versus state-planned, socialist); by 
ievel of econocic development and hence per capita incomes (economically 
advanced versus developing); by geographic size and natural resource en­
dowment; and by population, in absolute size and relative to the natural 
resource base. All these factors affect the degree and nature of their 
1The term "economies" is used rather than "nations" since while 
most autonomous economies ~re appropriately defined in terms of nation­
states some, notably Hong Kong and Taiwan, do not fit well into that 
definition. 
2nata on the USSR are included primarily because of its substantial 
trading relationship with Japan. Otherwise it can b~ regarded mainly 
as an European economy; for example most of its trade with the United 
States and Canada flows across the Atlantic rather than the Pacific. 
The Latin American economies are excluded since their trading relation­
ships with Asia are limited (though Mexico is an increasingly important 
exception). 
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trade and other economic relationships. A_major contr
ast is between 
those economies which export agricultural and natural 
resource com­
modities and those which must import them, while expo
rting manufactures. 
The contrast is particularly stark between those with 
abundant energy 
resources (oil and coal) not only absolutely but relat
ive to domestic 
demand--Australia, Canada, China, Indonesia, and Malay
sia--and those 
which must import large amounts, of which Japan is the m
ost important 
and extreme example. The differences even among the 
major economies 
measured by gross national product (GNP)--the United S
tates, USSR, 
Japan, China and Canada--are huge. The geographically
 large countries. -
have extensive agricultural and natural resources; Jap
an is at the 
Only China and Japan are densely populated relativeother extreme. 
to resource base; the United States and Japan have lar
ge industrial 
bases and high levels of per capita income; China is s
till at a low 
level of economic development. 
This heterogeneity provides opportunities for trade an
d other 
forms of economic exchange. The extent to which econo
mies take ad­
vantage of these opportunities depend upon their own e
conomic prior­
ities, strategies, and performance. In this paper the
 Asian-Pacific 
economies are divided between market-oriented and non-
market, or 
planned, economies; the market economies are further s
ubdivided into 
developed and developing (see Tables 1-5). 
Rapid Economic Growth and Development 
The most striking economic feature of the Asian-Pacifi
c economies 
has been their generally rapid rate of growth of GNP o
ver the past two 
decades, compared both to their historical performance
s and to the 
rest of the world. The patterns are of course varied
. Growth in 
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the developed countries slowed in the 1970s due in part to inflation, 
the oil shocks (especially that of 1973-74), and the policy efforts 
to handle those turbulent difficulties. In contrast the developing 
market economies continued to do exceptionally well; in some instances 
1
better than in the 1960s. Their rapid natural population growth began 
to slow, though remaining at rates well above those in the developed 
economies. The economic performances of China, North Korea, and the 
2USSR were also good according to World Bank data --somewhere between 
the region's developed and developing market economies (excluding Japan). 
The region's economies have participated in the development 
process in sequential waves. The United States continues 
as by far the largest and most important economy. The most 
profound change has been the rise of Japan--because of its 
initial size and sustained extremely rapid growth--to become 
by far the largest, most sophisticated, and most highly developed 
Asian economy and the world's third largest economy. The United 
States and Japan are the region's two major economic forces, trading 
nations, and sources of capital and technology. 
Five developing economies--South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Malaysia--have grown sufficiently rapidly and sustainedly 
to achieve per capita GNP levels in excess of $1,000 by 1978. The 
first four, with severe natural resource constraints, have founded 
1The 1973-4 oil shock had a relatively weak impact since industrialization 
was relatively more labor and less energy intensive, the share of indus­
trial activity lower, and growth policies were not abated. The 1979-80 oil 
price rise may have more severe effects since the industrial structure has 
changed so that energy is more important, and petrodollar recycling may 
be more difficult. 
2world Bank and International Monetary Fund data are used throughout, 
unless otherwise noted, in order to have comparable data. The economic 
performances of tragically war-torn Vietnam, Cambidoa, and Laos are not 
discussed due to lack of data. 
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econorr.ic success on export-orien
ted industrialization and rapid 
trade 
expansion; they are the first ti
er of Asian newly industrializin
g 
One consequence has been
economies, following the Japanes
e model. 
increases in their wages -as well
 as living standards, and hence 
efforts 
to move on from standard, labor-
intensive IT~nufactures to those 
re-
Malaysia, with
quiring.more labor skills, capit
al, and technology. 
more abundant natural resources 
(espec~ally oil, tin and rubber
) and a 
large initial trade involvement,
 has benefitted from more broadl
y­
based expansion of output and so
me improvement (unlike most econ
omies) 
in its terms of trade. 
A second tier of newly industria
lizing Asian economies, utilizing
 
relatively low-wage labor and st
andard, labor- intensive technolo
gies 
in relatively simple manufacture
s, is now beginning to move onto
 the 
scene. These include the Philip
pines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indon
esia 
With relatively more abundant na
tural
and, importantly, China. 
their growth to date has been fo
unded somewhat more on
resources, 
exports of primary products and 






in speed and degree, these econo
mies seem to be shifting toward 
a 
more export-oriented industriali
zation development strategy. 
I do not trace China's economic 
performance here. That is far 
too comprehensive and important 
a topic to encompass in this ove
rview. 
Moreover, data are of iimited av
ailability, and apparently in the
 
process of substantial revision 
and analysis to make them reason
ably 
·1
Indonesia has benefitted especia
lly from the sharp rise in the 
world price of oil, which has fu
eled a dramatic improvement in i
ts 
terms of trade and GNP growth. 
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Even greater lack of data precludecomparable to other countries.
1 
appraisal of North Korea's economy. 
Future growth prospects are difficult to proj
ect with much 
accuracy in light of uncertain~ies in both th
e world environment and 
domestic economies. In 1980 and for 1981-198
2 one can 
expect slowed growth in the region, due in su
bstantial part to the 
1979-80 sharp ·rise in oil prices and probable
 further increases, 
persistence of inflation and efforts to count
er it, the U.S. recession 
and probable slow recovery, and the policy-ind
uced slowdown in Japan­
ese growth. Growth thereafter should acceler
ate once again. 
Over a longer time horizon of ten to twenty y
ears plausible 
cases can be ar6ued for either the continuati
on of a slower (2 percent) 
U.S. growth rate, or some acceleration (to 4 pe
rcent plus). Japan is 
likely to grow at 5-7 percent, ~ore rapidly t
han other developed 
This will make it an ever morecountries including Western Europe. 
powerful force in the Western Pacific. It is
 likely that the Asian 
developing market economies will continue to 
grow relatively rapidly. 
China's growth prospects appear good, even th
ough many problems persist. 
Overall, a rather optimistic vision of~ dyna
mic, quite rapidly growing 
Asian-Pacific region seems warranted for the 
remainder of this century. 
The Bar:::'::1world Bank, World Development Report. 1980, p
. 158. 
1979 Report listed a China per capita GNP in 
1977 of $390 and a 1960-
77 per capita growth rate of 5.1 percent; the
 1980 figure of $230 for 
1978, combined with the 3.7 percent growth rate, 
implies a 1960 GNP 
per capita of about $120. These data reflect 
conversions at official
Purchasing power
exchange rates, and do not include all GNP ite
ms. 
measures provide substantially higher estimat
es of Chinese and other 
~eveloping country GNPs and per capita incom
es. 
-7-
Rapidly Expanding Trade and Increasing Economic Interdependence 
One dramatic feature of the Asian-Pacific region has been the 
rapid expansion, absolutely and relatively, of trade and related 
economic relationships among its members. 
1 In 1965 merchandise ex­
ports of the region's economies to each other amounted to $26.1 bil
­
lion, some 47.5 percent of their total exports and 15.9 percent of 
total world trade. 
2 By 1979 intra-regional exports amounted to 
$279.6 billion (of which the USSR had $2.8 billion), 55.6 percent o
f 
their total exports and 17.9 percent of world total exports (see 
Table 5). The increase in the intra-regional share in world trade 
despite the sharp rises in oil prices (from which main beneficiaries
- -
were not in the region) is impressive. 
It is also important to r~cognise that as rapidly as their exports 
have grown, regionally and globally, the total imports of almost al
l 
the Asian-Pacific economies have increased in even larger amounts; 
over time they have tended to run current account deficits and to 
borrow from abroad. As importers they have provided rapidly expand
­
ing market opportunities for exporters in the region and elsewhere 
in the world. While in part current account deficits reflect and 
offset OPEC oil-induced surpluses, the developing market economies 
as well as Australia and Canada have been substantial net borrowers
 
(and importers) in addition. 
There are many reasons for this successful trade performance. 
Led by the United States, the world economy continued to maintain 
1
. For further discussion see Peter Drysdale and Hugh Patrick, 
"Evaluation of a Proposed Asia~-Pacific Regional Economic Organizat
ion," 
in Congressional Research Service, An Asian-Facific Region3l Economic 
Organization: An Exploratory Concept Paper, for the Committee on Foreig
n 
Relations, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C., July 1979), pp. 1-25, 29-
74. 
2rn these aggregates, in principle exports equal imports. Trade amon
g 
socialist economies is not included in trade totals, but between ma
rket and 
socialist economies is. USSR trade with the region is excluded in th
ese 1965 
measures but is included in 1979 data. The difference is not signif
icant. 
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a relatively free and open, nrultiluteral system of international tra
de, 
payments, capital, and technology flows. Over the past decade Japan
 has quietlv 
exercised ir.creasing leadership in maintaining this trade-enhancing
 
world systerr, mainly by-substantially opening its own markets, thou
gh not as 
Rapid economicextensively or rapidly as its trading partners would like. 
growth has been a major factor; it generated both higher demands fo
r 
imports and ~reater capacities to export. First-tier developing 
market economies increased trade proportions and their own growth 
rates by successfully adopting foreign-trade oriented strategies to
 
replace earlier, inward-looking import-substitution approaches to 
Thus, the region's economies have increasinglyindustrialization. 
exploited their evolving comparative advantare as shaped by their 
land and natural resource bases, growing labor supplies (in quality
 
as well as quantity), growth of capital stock, and opportunities to
 
import, diffuse, and adapt more advanced technologies. 
The importance of trade as measured by its share in GNP varies 
It depends on domesticsubstantially among the region's economies. 
market size and degree of specialization in production, domestic 
resource base, level of development, and especially government 
policy. Net surprisingly, most intra-regional trade is among the 
developed market economies themselves; in 1979 their exports to eac
h 






Next most important weredeveloping market 
economy exports to ($49.9 billion, 17.8 percent) and imports from 
1Note that as measured by this trade matrix expo~ts equals imports 
within any group of economies. Thus two-way trade an:ong the region
's 
__developed econo~ies amounted to $272.2 billion. 
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($45.2 billion, 16.2 percent) the develope
d rr.arket econo~ies; exports 
Trade
among themselves were smaller ($19.0 billi
on, 6.8 percent). 
between the nonmarket (socialist) economi
es and the developed and 
developing market econorr.·ies was only 4.8 
percent, reflecting social­
ist relatively autarchic development poli
cies and the large size 
of China's domestic market. 
China's.exports to the region were $7.4 b
illion (62.9 percent 
of its total exports), imports from the r
egion $7.6 billion (59.8 
percent of total imports); this comprised
 2.7 percent of intra­
In 1979 total merchandise exports plusregional two-way trade. 
imports amounted to 11.2 percent of China
's estimated 1978 GNP
1 
(according to cata in Tables 2 and 5), su
bstantially below the U.S. 
figure of 18.0 percent, the Japan figure 
of 23.8 percent, and the 
substantially higher trade/GNP ratios of 
all the other market 
economies. The appropriate focus is not 
upon socialist versus 
capitalist economic systems but.upon the 
degree of market orientation, 
with its reliance upon the price mechanism
s in domestic and foreign 
economic policy. (Hungary is one exam?le 
of a market-oriented social­
ist economy.) Should China adopt a substa
ntially higher degree of 
market orientation, the role of foreign t
rade and its interdependence· 
with foreign economies will further incre
ase. 
1usually it is better to use same year data
 for calculating such 
ratios. However, China's trade expanded 
by 39 percent in 1979; 1979 
GNP data are not yet available. The use 
of 1979 trade data and 1978 
GNP data only slightly ov~rstates the rat
io amounts; a purchasing 
power measure of GNP would reduce the trad
e ratios of the socialist 
and developing market economies. 
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The coz:!odity composition of trade
 has been determined by 
natural and human resource endowm
ents, the timing and patterns of 
economic growth and development, a
nd government development strategi
es. 
The resource abundant nations--not
ably the United States, Australia,
 
Canada, Indonesia, and China, but 
also Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines--export foodgrains, m
inerals, and/or fuels (oil and coa
l) 
to the resource-deficient nations 
with high levels of industrial act
iv­
First Japan
ity--Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, H
ong Kong and Singapore. 




res for export, and subsequently b
egan 
to move into manufactures requirin
g more skilled labor, technology a
nd 
capital. Their exports have gbne 
to the United States and the other
 
developed economies, with Japan no
w becoming an increasingly import
ant 
market. The second-tier economies
 are now beginning to displace the
 
At the
first-tier in simple labor-intensi
ve manufactures for export. 
Dame time, they are likely to engag
,e somewhat more in resource-pro­
cessing industrialization; where i
t may be relatively capital-intens
ive 
foreign capital will be available.
 However, most have yet to make t
he 
transition from an import-competin
g to an export-promoting ind~scri
al­
ization strategy, and it will take
 some time for them to have a majo
r 
Japan and the United States are th
e world's two larges~
trade impact. 
importers of oil in addition to la
bor-intensive manufactures; they 
compete increasingly in exporting 
higher-technology machinery and 
related products. In general co1!l
lllodity trade patterns suggest a 
complementary, vertical division o
f labor among the region's econom
ies,. 
but one that has changed rapidly d
ue to the geographic spreading of 
industrial activity, a dynamic pro
cess which will persist. 
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The major differences in sizes
 of economies~ as well as thei
r 
Put simply, two nations
degrees of trade, have wide ra
mifications. 
are predominant amoag the Asia
n-Pacific eco~omies: the United
 States 
and Japan. U.S. exports compr
ise 27.3 percent of total expo
rts in the 
region, U.S. imports 32.9 perc
ent of total imports in the re
gion. 
Trade
Comparable figures for Japan a
re 22.1 and 19.2 percent. 
between the United States and 
Japan alone accounts for 15.7 
percent 
1
of the region's trade. 
For almost all economies in th
e region, the United States an
d 
Japan are their first and seco
nd largest trading partners gl
obally,· 




developing mark~t economies' e
xports (and 45.4 percent of th
eir total 
exports), and supply 59.1 perc
ent of their imports from the 
region (40.9 
percent of their total imports
). Similarly 43.9 percent of C
hina's 
regional exports (and 27.6 per
cent of total exports) go to J
apan and 
the United States, and 70.7 pe
rcent of China's regional impo
rts (and 
On the other hand,
42.3 percent of total imports) 
are from them. 
neither Japan nor the United S
tates are as reliant upon any 
single 
3 
economy or pair of economies i
n their intra-regional trade. 
Similarly 
the United States and Japan ar
e the major sources of foreign
 direct 
investment, foreign aid, portf
olio capital, and technology f
or almost 
all of the region's economies •
 
. 1 .
U.S.-Canada trade is an even l
arger proportion (25.3 percent
), but 
Canada has only modest trade w
ith the rest of the region. 
2china is one exception since H
ong Kong is its largest export
 
smaller source of imports. Th
e entrepot trade
market, though a much 
rol1;:::S of both Uong Kong an(! Si
ngapore are of general importa
nce for the 
region. 
3E.-ccluding their trade ,.ith eac
h other, and U.S. trade with C
anada. 
This does not mean dependence flows only one way, from the 
smaller economies to the two economic giants. The bilateral inter­
action impacts do loom larger for the sm.J.ller economies. 
1 Nonethe­
less, both the United S~ates and Japan need trade and related econ­
omic relationships with the region's other economies in order to gain 
the dynamic benefits of specialization according to comparative 
advantage, te obtain essential imports, and to earn foreign exchange 
to pay for imports. And of course the direct bilateral economic re­
lationship is of major importance and benefit to both Japan and the 
United States despite various difficulties for certain import-compet-
2 . b h .i ng sectors in ot countries. 
Heightened economic interdependence amon 5 the Asian-Pacific 
economies is due not only to their rapid economic growth and trade 
expansion. Interdependence, regionally and globally, has 
also been much affected by the sharply changing international economic 
and political conditions of the 1970s, including especially the forma­
tion of OPEC and the evolving North-South dialogue on the most 
appropriate arrangements for trade, commodity pricing, capital and 
aid flows, foreign direct investment, technology transfer, ocean re­
source development, and the like. Accordingly, both successful economic 
performance and changing international circumstances have raised a 
number of important issues and problems for the economies of the 
Asian-Pacific region. 
1See Lawrence B. Krause and Sueo Sekiguchi, ed., Economic Inter-
action in the Pacific Basin (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1980). 
2See the Report of the Japan-United States Economic Relations Group 




Circumstances specific to each Asian-Pacific economy shape 
what its policymakers deem to be the most important problems and 
issues in its economic relationships with others in the region. A 
number of issues are important for the region as a 'Whole. Moreover 
interest is growing in finding regional mechanisms to manage better 
these economic interdependences as they evolve. 
One fundamental problem lies in the adjustments required in the 
industrial structure of the developed economies as a conseq~ence of 
the successful, rapid industrialization first of Japan> now of the 
first tier of newly industrializing economies, and potentially the 
second tier. These problems of structural adjustment are particularly 
severe for the United States because it is the world's largest market, 
that market is relatively open, competition from imports has hurt a 
number of major American industries while benefitting all Americans 
as consumers, ·and the United States as the leader.of the international 
economic system has long been committed to a foreign policy of relatively 
free trade.While the American economy has grown absolutely, that growth 
has been less rapid than that of Japan, Europe, and the newly indus­
trializing economies. Accordingly, U~S. economic pover has 
declined relatively. Combined with domestic difficulties in the 
turbulent 1970s of inflation, unemployment, and recessions in 1974-75 
and 1980, it is not surprising that protectionist pressures have 
increased in the United States against imports of highly competitive 
manufactured goods from Japan and other Asian-Pacific economies. 
It is impressive that the U.S. government has generally succeeded 
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in maintaining its liberal trade p
olicy against these pressures. 
This is exemplified not only in th
e successful passage in 1979 of 
the legislation emanating from the
 Tokyo Round of multilateral trade
 
-
negotiations, but in U.S. trade da
ta itself. 
As Table 6 shows, the United State
s has greatly incrensed its 
trade involvement in the 1970s, io
porting higher proportions of man
­
ufactured goods as well as oil, an
d exporting much more as well. 
Nonetheless, the ongoing requireme
nts of struc~ural adjustment and 
domestic economic problems mean th
at protectionist pressures to 
raise import barriers are likely t
o persist. How·American policy­
makers cope with these pressures w
ill be a significant factor in the
 
maintenance of ~he United States g
lobal and regional leadership role
. 
Continued and expanded access to t
he markets of the developed 
nations, notably the United States
 and Japan, is vital for almost a
ll 
Asian-Pacific economies, especiall
y those which have adopted an exp
ort­
oriented industrialization develop
ment strategy or are comtemplating
 
At present
doing so. It is also of considera
ble importance for China. 
Japan is more explicitly committed
 than the United States to long-ru
n 
policies to bring about the chang
es in domestic industrial structur
e 
This has
necessitated by rising industriali
zation in other parts of Asia. 
potentially profound implications 
for economic and hence political r
ela­
tionships in the region. 
A second important issue is secur
ity of supply of foodstuffs, oil, 
and other raw materials to econom
ies where domestic supplies are in
­
Japan is by far the most vulnerab
le of the large economies.
sufficient. 
It vigorously pursues policies to 
assure stable imports of essentia
l 
raw materials. This is an importa
nt aspect of its economic relation
-
ships with the United States, Aus
tralia, Canada, Indonesia, and Ch
ina. For 
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the United States, Japan, 2.nd indeed most of the region's economies 
the greatest potential threat to economic security would be substan
tial, 
sustained interruptions of the supply of oil, the lifeblood of 
industrialized economies. Oil-deficit countries are vulnerable to 
adverse developments in the Middle East, .the continuing main source
 
of the region's oil imports. 
The price of oil is also a major problem. OPEC large and sudden 
increases in oil prices have disruptive, depressing effects upon th
e 
oil-importing economies. They generate inflationary pressures, as 
well as those for adjustment of the industrial structure. Economie
s 
must export more, and often borrow more, to pay their increased imp
ort • 
When the United States and Japan respond by slowing domesticbill. 
growth, exports by the region fall. The recycling of OPEC surplu
s 
earnings through world financial markets to those economies most in
 
rieed of borrowing has gone relatively well to date, but it is not 
without cost, and fraught with potential future proble~$. 
Fundamental to all these issues is the maintenance of ancpen, 
multilateral, competitive, and just system for international trade,
 
payments, capital flows, and technology transfer. The developing 
economies, regionally and globally, have been urging modifications 
in the rules of the system to provide them better access to the 
markets of the developed nations, more foreign aid, more and better
 
terms for technology transfer, and the like. Nonetheless, it has 
been in the common interest of all market economies, developing and 
developed, to maintain the liberal international economic system 
which has prevailed since the 1950s. 
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In an earlier postwar era that system could be maintained under 
virtually unilateral U.S. leadership. Smali economies could safely 
act as if their exports and trade policies would have no impact on 
the rest of the world. That era is over. The United States 
shares its economic power with others. It can no longer insulate 
domestic economic policy decisions from their foreign economic impli­
cations. Similarly, previously small economies have become larger 
and their trade impact more noticeable. Economic actions are trans­
mitted from one economy to another in this regional schema of inter­
dependence, and feed back to the originator. 
Accordingly, various Asian-Pacific economies have com~ to seek 
new ways to manage their economic interdependence better. These 
include consideration of various arrangements for regional or sub­
regional economic cooperation, to complement the global set of arrange­
ments on the one hand and bilateral relationships, notably with the 
United States ·and Japan, on the other. ASEAN represents one such 
institutional development. 
Over the past two years interest in exploring the possibilities 
of forming a Pacific economic community has increased significantly. 
It has beco~e more than an academic concept, in large part because 
Prime Minister Ohira established a Japanese study group in December 
1978 to examine the desirability and feasibility of such ideas. This 
set into force a process by which the views of other governments-­
Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and eventually the ASEAN 
nations and South Korea--were sought. As a result a special Seminar 
on the Pacific Community was held at Australian National University 
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in Canberra in September 1980, with participa
nts from the developed 
and main developing market economies, includin
g representatives both 
from governments in their private capacities 
and the private sector. 
-
This inclusion in the discussions of both pub
lic and private sector 
representatives is virtually unique, differen
t from the OECD govern­
It suggests potentially an active, constructi
ve, in­
mental model. 
stitutional involvement among governments, bu
sinesses, and policy­
oriented scholars. 
Underlying this political process are the fun
damental economic 
forces that make such possible arrangements 
attractive. To recapitu­
late, they include sustained, rapid growth of
 most Asian-Pacific 
economies, in the past and probably in the flt
ure; major expansion 
in foreign trade, intra-regionally and with the
 rest of the world; 
increasing regional economic interdependence 
and growing recognition 
of that fact; a large number of new problems,
 in part a consequence 
of trade expansion, in part due to events in 
the rest of the world; 
and an interest in finding practical mechanism
s for consideration 
of these problems by development of a regiona
l middle ground between 
lt is increasingly per-.
traditional bilateral and global mechanisms. 
ccivcd there are regional problems with regio
nal solutions. 
It is premature to determine what kind of reg
ional institutional 
arrangements, if any, will emerge from this p
rocess, which has only 
begun. Clearly what brings participants toge
ther is the pragmatic 
recognition of strong common economic interes
ts rather than any high 
It was apparent in Canberradegree of shared ideologies and values. 
that participants share a healthy desire to m
aintain a.,d sustain 
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national identity and independence against potential external pressures 
and threats, but are not seeking a security-oriented organization. 
Not surprh,ingly the nations most interested are those most involved 
in foreign trade. They apparently seek a loose-knit consultative arrangement 
which would help to manage better the economic problems inevitable 
in a system of economic interdependence. Pacific regional 
economic cooperation, in whatever institutional form, is seen by 
most of its proponents as a practical way to complement at a 
manageable level commitments both to a global, multilateral, non-
discriminatory economic system and to special bilateral economic 
relationships. 
This approc>.ch is designed to be beneficial, and certainly non­
threatening, to all the economies of the Asian-Pacific region. Given 
their commonality of economic interests, it is not surprising that 
the initial focus has been on the market economies. Participation 
by the ASEMr nations is essential; however, to date they have ex-
pressed a mixture of interest in and willingness to explore the 
possibilities and considerable skepticism. On the other hand, neither the 
United States nor Japan are prepared to·take leadership initiative, 
somewhat uncertain of their own interests and unwilling to be seen 
as trying to dominate the region. The American government's position. 
is apparently one of cautious interest but no commitment until it is 
clear that others, particularly ASEAN, are prepared to move ahead. 
7hc discussions indicate the Asian-Pacific market economies ~..nt 
any Pacific economic community that may emerge to be of mutual benefit 
with China. There is consideracle awareness of potential pitfalls, and 
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a strong desire to avoid them. Mech
anisms which impro~e trading 
arrangements among the Asian-Pacific 
economies without discriminating 
against others will help not only th
e participants but all who trade 
with them. 
Implications for China-United States
 Economic Relations 
It is no~ surprising that, as China h
as changed its domestic and 
foreign economic policies and as Chi
na and the United States have 
established diplorr.atic relationships
, the recent economic relationship h
aB 
There are a host of bilateral trade, 
finance,
had a strong bilateral focus. 
direct investment, and technology tra
nsfer issues to be dealt with. Yet 
these cannot be resolved in isolation
. Neither nation can ignore the 
implications for, and interactions w
ith, its other trading partners 
in the region and elsewhere. The Asian
-Pacific environment provides 
an important part of the setting wit
hin which China-United States 
Mutual opportunities and problemseconomic relations will develop. 
are appropriately viewed in a broade
r regional economic context. In 
bilateral economic arrangements basedan American perspective, 
on special favors could harm U.S. in
terests vis a vis all the other econ
omies 
of the region, including the USSR. 
It is premature to project in much d
etail or wit~ much confidence 
future prospects for the China-Unite
d States economic relationship. Tra
de 
resumed in.1972 and while increasing
 rapidly only surpassed $1 billion 
annually in 1978. As shbwn in Table 
5 it amounted to $2.3 billion in 197
9, I 
It is anticipated that absolute
and an estimated $3.8 billion in 198
0. 
amounts of bilateral trade will incre
ase throughout the. 1980s but at sub­
stantially slower rates. 
The trade pattern to date reflects a
 mix of comparative advantage 
The United States exports much more 
to China
and government policies. 
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than it imports. Unprocessed agricultural products--cotton, corn, wheat, 
soybeans--arnounted to $946.1 million, 55.1 percent of U.S. exports, in 1979;
 
in October 1980 2 wheat and corn sales agreement covering 1981-84 was signed
, 
amounting to sales of about $1 billion (6-9 million tons) annually. High 
technology it£ms make up-ffiost of the remainder; this clearly is the area of 
potential high export growth in the long_ run. China's exports to the United 
States are much more diversified. Natural resources comprise about one­
quarter; most· exports consist of a wide range of textile and other labor­
intensive manufactures. 
Economic relations have, not surprisingly, increased substantially 
and covered a wider range of transactions since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the United States and China on January 1, 1979.
 
The subsequent two years have been devoted to laying the institutional 
framework in both countries for economic interaction in many dimensions, 
though the process is not yet completed. A variety of agreements have 
been signed covering trade, civil aviation, shipping, patent, copyright, 
and trademark protection, a commercial-dispute settlement mechanism, and 
The United States has revised its ex-the settlement of past claims. 
port control regulations to permit sales of certain high technology 
products and some categories of military support equi?~ent, though not 
military equipment itself. The US Export-Import Bank in late fall 1980 
The Overseasmade available to China a $2 billion line of credit. 
Private Investment Corporation expanded to China, as of October 1980, 
its safeguards to American corporate investment abroad. China has begun 
the yrocess of establishing the domestic institu~ional framework and 
rules for foreign investment and co-production in China, and for expanded 
foreign economic interchange generally, though the system is not yet in 
place. 
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Nonetheless, a number of major trade and related econo
mic issues of 
longer-run significance remain. These include: access
 of Chinese manu­
factures to the U.S. market; the availability of such 
goods on com­
petitive terms; U.S. policy restrictions on the export
 of military 
equipment and other high technology hardware and softw
are of strategic 
The first two
significance; and the large bilateral trade inbalance.
 
issues are directly related to broader regional (and g
lobal) concerns. 
From an American perspective, bilateral trade must be 
governed 
by the general rules of market competition in a relati
vely open, 
With American provision of most-favored-nationmultilateral system. 
treatment to Chinese exports and the recent joint agre
ement on tex­
tile quotas, it can be said the United States has acce
pted China 
into this trading system. Chinese policymakers will d
etermine what 
China imports; the United States will have to compete 
with other 
In turn China will have to competeexporters in selling to China. 
with other economies in selling in the American market; 
in certain 
products of interest to China, notably textiles, Amer
ican policy-
makers have imposed import restraints. Certainly the 
United States will 
want to tLaintain its existing good trading relationshi
ps with Japan 
and other Asian-Pacific economies, and expand trade w
ith them. It 
is important that Chinese exporters understand well th
e rules and 
and the specificprocedures governing trade with the United States 
requirements for selling in the American market, in w
hich private 
consumer and business behavior play the major role. 
There are substantial complementarities between Chine
se and 
American production and trade possibilities. However
, those comple-
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mentaries also exist for both vis a vis other Asian-Pacific economies. 
China exports oil, and both the United States and Japan are large oil 
importers; transport costs alone suggest Japan rather than the United 
States will be the major.foreign buyer of Chinese oil, even though oil was the 
single largest American import item ($71.8 million) from China in 1979, and 
probably in 1980 as well. China needs to import machinery and related high­
technology hardware and software; both the United States and Japan are important 
sources of supply, though thus far the direct competition has been 
less than might superficially be expected. The bilateral trade data 
suggest the United States has more to sell to China--agricultural 
products as well as machinery and equipment--than it has to buy from 
China. So long as China is able and willing to participate in a 
system of multilateral trade and settlements, to cover trade deficits 
by borrowing, and the United States and others are willing to lend, 
bilateral balance need not be a serious issue. 
Assuming China in the longer run plans major expansion of exports 
in order to pay for imports, important issues with broad regional rami­
fications are: what will China have to sell, to whom, and under what 
conditions? China's comparative advantage lies in the export of minerals, 
notably oil and coal, and manufactured goods produced by labor-intensive 
methods. It is unlikely that the volumes of oil and coal exports can be 
increased significantly in the next five years; production has apparently 
peaked in present onshore oil fields, domestic demand is rising, and 
significant offshore production cannot occur quickly. The development 
of coal mines will also take time. Yet in the longer run it is of high 
priority for the United States and Japan, and indeed all energy users, 
as well as China that Chinese production and exports of oil and coal be 
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For China there will be a ready market withoutexpanded substantially. 
significant problems of market penetration; for consumers the world
 
supply of energy ~ill be increased and its sources diversified. Th
ese ex­
port opportunities for China are great--but so too are the problems
 of 
increasing production. 
'While growth of labor-intensive manufactured goods can be assumed, 
its rate of growth may well depend substantially upon China's degree 
They are probably substitutes:of success in expanding energy exports. 
with given import requirements, China may attempt to increase manufact
ured 
goods exports more rapidly if energy exports lag. Such a strategy 
would 
have its own problems. The future capability of the Chinese econom
y to 
produce adequate amounts of manufactured exports competitive in pri
ce 
and quality is ·one concern. Market access is another. 
The protracted bilateral negotiations concerning the size of U.S. 
import quotas.on Chinese textiles represent an atypical extreme. 
The international multifiber textile agreement, by which the United
 States 
imposes bilateral quota restrictions on textile imports, is the maj
or 
exception to the general principle of free, open, competitive trade
. 
It has substantially restricted textile exports by Japan, South Ko
rea, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, and is a trade barrier to second-tier econom
ies 
as they industrialize. American allocation of quotas is difficult;
 
good econo~ic criteria are hard to apply. The United States feels 
constrained in how large a textile quota it can allocate to China b
oth 
by pressure from the American textile industry and by concern that it 
treat its other Asian-Pacific trading partners fairly. -As a conseq
uence 
China's textile quota is and will probably continue to be modest. 
How­
ever, the present bilateral agreement covers only a few (eight) text
ile 
-24-
product categories, but with a strong antisurge provision covering 
other textile products. Where imports increase sharply, the United 
States can ask for consultations in order to establish a quota: if 
negotiations fail, imports can be restricted by an unilaterally-imposed 
quota set by a formula. 
This has already occurred in the case of wool sweaters, not under 
the initial quota provisions. In 1980 United States imports of sweaters 
from China increased sharply to some 225,000 dozen, second only to 
those from Taiwan. Following an American request in October 1980 for 
consultations and subsequent failure to reach agreement, in January 1981 
a quota of 183,076 dozen was set for the fifteen-month period October 
like other nations before it, will probably1980-January 1912. China, 
seek export expansion in other textile categories, which will provoke 
reactions by the American industry and other regional economies already 
subject to quota restrictions. It is easy to predict that further 
textile disputes will occur. How they are managed will be a substantial 
test of the bilateral relationship in a broader context. They probably 
will be an ongoing irritant without fundamentally undermining the 
overall relationship. 
The exceptional case of textiles underscores the extent to which 
China's economic interests lie in American maintenance of a liberal 
trading system and against any spread of protectionism. On net balance, 
it is probably reasonable to assume the U.S. market will continue to 
be open for most labor-intensive and other manufactures of direct 
. 
interest to China. China will be in direct competition with other 
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Asian-Pacific economies, especially the other second-tier nations. 
However, all of them will in substantial degree be replacing 
import market shares presently held by Japan and first-tier econom
ies. 
The United States will have to extend even-handed treatment to all;
 
even so the political ramifications are obvious. Moreover, in the 
absence of special assistance, American firms facing severe import 
competition will continue to invoke support under the laws against 
dumping or severe injury. 
China is interested not only in access to the U.S. market and 
to the purchase of U.S. goods, but also in obtaining American techn
ology, 
finance and direct investment capital. Like all host countries Ch
ina 
can be expecte~ to set the general framework in which it imports 
As a socialist economy, ittechnology and capital as well as goods. 
has its own rules which differ substantially from those of capital
ist 
China will have to deal not only with the U.S. government,economies. 
but also with private banks and businesses with their own objective
s 
and modes of behavior. A.~erican enterprises will of course have to
 
compete with their Japanese, European, and other counterparts. 
The American government has not ye~ made available large amounts 
of credit to China on concessionary terms through any bilateral for
eign 
aid (official development assistance) program, and its U.S. Export­
Given fundingImport Bank commitments are relatively modest thus far. 




well perceive any substantial amounts of U.S. official credit to 
China as a diversion from their own needs. For is it clear that U
.S. 
terms would be acceptable to China. 
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Under appropriate conditions substantial private American capital 
and technology will flow to China. Some will be specific to China, 
hence not likely to represent a substantial diversion from investment 
elsewhere in the region; this includes oil and other natural resource 
development projects but perhaps also large-scale projects for the 
domestic market, such as truck production. Joint enterprise or co­
production arrangements for labor-intensive manufactures are other 
potentially attractive investment possibilities. Presumably they 
would have a substantial export focus. American fir.ns would have,· 
in addition to capital and technology, superior knowledge of American 
tastes and established marketing channels. Investment and trade would 
go hand in hand. However, such projects could well represent a diver­
sion of American business activities from other developing economies 
in the region to China. On the other hand, such 
joint investment projects may well be undertaken by overseas Chinese, 
a direct source of diversion from their potential investment in ASEL~~ 
or other economies. 
From the perspectives of both the United States and China, 
the most important implications lie in the triangular economic rela­
tionship with Japan. Japan's economic complementarity with China 
is greater than America's with China, yet Japan and the United 
States are of far greater importance to each other. Japan is likely, 
by economic need as well as its policies allowingimports of textiles 
and other labor-intensive manufactures (with the notable exception of 
silk), to develop trade more rapidly with China than does the United 
States. 
-27-
The complex set of economic interdependencies in the region will 
be influenced by the degree, speed, ar.d nature of expansion of the 
China-U.S. economic relationship. Both the realities and the per~ 
ceptions of this bilateral relationship will be complex and ambiguous, 
with no simple generalizations possible. Much depends on China's 
economic performance--the rapidity of domestic economic growth and 
Much also dependsits structure--and China's foreign trade policy. 
upon United States trade and credit policies. It will be in the 
interests of both nations to seek a market-oriented economic relation-
ship rather than one based. on special bilateral deals because of the 
implications for their interactions with the other economies of the 
region. 
Expansion of U.S.-China economic relations can be viewed by the 
other Asian-Pacific economies both as an opportunity--where it is a 
result of China's general economic success with an overall expansion 
of trade--and as a competitive threat--where it is at their own expense be­
cause of increased Chinese competition in the U.S. market, other third 
country markets, and indeed their own markets. Probably Japau, the 
other developed countries, and the first tier of newly industrializing 
economies will, on net balance, benefit from Chinese expansion of 
trade. However, the second tier developing market economies (notably 
ASEA.~ excluding Singapore) could well be net losers, especially if 
there is a 'diversion of American textile import quotas, capital, co-
production investment, and technology flows from them to China. 
These complex interactions would feed back not only to the economic 
relationships with the Asia-Pacific economies of both China and the 
United States, but to their political relationships as well. 
---------
TABLE 1 
ANO NATURAt, RF.SOURCE F.NllOWMF.NTSASIAN-PACIFIC ECONOMIES: BASIC HUMAN 
Natural Resource·Endowments Per Ca,e_ital'OI?,Ulntion Area 
c d eLandb Oil Coal Iron Ore Copper TinAverar,e Annual 
(Millions} Crowth Rate (%) (thousands 
(1977, ha) (ton) (1976, ton) · (1976, ton) (1976, ton) (1976,ton)Mid-197& 1970-78 of krn2) 
VP.loped: .3. 3 16 16,700 17 0.39United Stnteg 221.9 0.8 9,363 
16.9 39 4,700 470 1.3623.5 1.2 9,976Canada 
0.3 0.1Japnn 114 .9 1.2 372 
11•• 2 1.6 7,687 42.8 20 14,300 770 0.55 0.024f\.ustralia 
6. 7 . 5~ew Zealand 3.2 1.6 269 
veloping Market 
conomies: 
q9 0.2South Korea %.Ii 1.9 
0.2 0.1Taiwan 17.1 2 .o 36 
!long Kong 4.6 1.9 1 0.01 00 N ' 0.38Philippines 45.6 2.1 300 o.s 0.1 ' 
Thailand /14. 3 2.7 514 0.9 0.028 
Malaysia l J. 1 2.7 330 2.2 28 0.067 
Singapore :! • 3 1.5 1 0.01 
Indonesia l '.36. rJ 1.8 2,027 1.1 9 0.017 
Papua New Guinea 2 • '.l 2.4 lt62 12.9 0.1 3 .1,. 
Burm:t 32.2 2.2 677 1.7 
nn1c.1rket: 
China 1))2.2 l..6 9,597 0.5 2.7 3 0.002 
' North Korea 17 .1 2.6 121 0.1 
330 o.sVietncm 51.7 2.9 
l 81 2.0Cambodia ~.4a .. 
Laos 3.] 1.3 237 4.8 
u.s.s.R. :rit.P 0.9 22,402 5,9 34 110 0,1ft 0,002 
---------------- -·--··· --·-
a: 1977. b: Land includes arable land, permanent pasture, and forest or woods. c: As of Janunry 1, 1980. 
d: Rituminous coal and lignite. e: Recoverable iron. 
World Bank, World Development Report, 1980, World Bank Atlas, 1979; IMF, International Financial Statistics Year­Sources: 
honk 1979; Food and Agricultural Organization~ Production Yearbook 1978; Penn~ell Publishing Co., International Petrolem 
L_ncyclopedia 1980; Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of Interior, Commodity Data Summaries 1977. 




ASIAN-PACIFIC ECONOMIES: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
GNPc Growth Rate G~P per Capita Share in r..~•D~P-'-o~f____ 
Exports of ~OMS 
Averar,e Annual and nonfactor 
(CDP 1 Annual Average) Amount($) 
· ';rowth (%) Industry(%) services (Z)(Billions of U.S. 
1960-78 1978 1918dollars) 1978 1960-70 1970-76 1978 
Developed: 9,590 2.4 34 8 United StatH 2,127.6 4.3 3.0 
5,6 4.4 9,180 3,5 31 26216.lCanada 117,280 7.6 40Japan 8 36 ."2 10.5 5.0 
3.8 7,990 2,9 32 16 Australia 113,8 4.1 318 272.2 4,7~ 1.7New Zealand 15,3 3,9 
Developlnr, Market 
Ecouomies: 
South Korea 42,5 8.5 9.7 1,160 6,l 36
 34 
591,400 6.S 48Taiwan 23.9 9.'2 a.ob 3188,2 3,040 6,; 98 !long Kong 14.1 10.0 
6,'.) 2.5 35 ·Philippines 23,3 5 .·l 510 
19 
21490 4. r, 27Thailand 21.8 8,'2 7.6 
1,090 3. ') 32Malaysia 14,5 6,5 7.8 
51 
7 .,. 353,290Sinr,apore 7.7 8.8 8.5 
164 
360 4.1 33Indonesia 48,8 3.5 7.8 
21 
268 45560 3.6Papua New Guinea. 1.6 6.5 2.6 
150 1.0 lJBurma 4.9 2,6 4.0 
7 
Nonmarket: 230d 3,7




Cambodia .. 3.1 90 .. i48 20,3 ..Laos 
5.3 3,700 4.3 62 u.s.s.a. 965,5. 5,,l 
\ a: 1977. b: 1970-/7, c: Preliminary except U.S.A. (From World nank Atlno, 1979 ). 

























World Bank, World neve]opment Report, 1980, Wor]d flank Atlas, 1979 and IMF, International Financial StatisticsSources: 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and ArmedYearbook 1979 (May 1980); 
Transfers 1968-1977 (October 1979). 
Note: .•- indicates da-ta -not available. 
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ASIAN-PACIFIC ECONOMIESs MERCHANDISE TRAD! 
Current Acc,,u~t Bnlance
d Terns of Trade before interest payment,
Merchandise Trn e 
Averalle Annunl Export Grol.'th R11.te (%) Avernge Annual Irr.port
 Gro1.'th Rate(%) (E'70•100) on External P•.1~l1c J.,bt 
Am:>lfflt (millions of dollars) 1%0-70 1970-78 l'.178 1978(m1111ons of ~oll:
,r'3
bporu (1978) Imports (1978) 1960-70 1970-78 
Developed: 9,8 5.4 77 -4, 4 3.! 
t:nited Statea 141.154 182.787 6.0 
6,5 
102 -~,617
Canad.3 46,065 43.434 9.9 4.3 9.3
 7.1 
88 17,)289.7 13.7 5.0Japan 97,501 78,731 17.5 -),6Vi
Australia 94 -187u.121 13,885 6.5 
4,0 7.2 5.1 98 
Nev Ze3land J. 7S2 3.500 4.6 2.4 3,0
 3.) 
l;.J
Developing Market C 
I 
tconorues: 81 -455 I 
South Korea 12,711 14,972 35.2 28.8 20.1 13.5
 
7S 1.9799.3 17.9 9.1Tat11an 12,682 11,033 23.7 317a
l!ong Kong 11,499 13,452 12.7 4.8 9.2 3.2 
97
69 -9914.7Philippines 3.425 5,143 2.2 5,4 7.2 82 -1.098
Th.Jil3nd 4,085 5,256 5.2 12,2 11.2 5.6 284
6,1 5.2 2.7 6.8 119~.ilaysla 7.413 5,929 
5.9 8,1 .. -669Sir.;:;apore 10.134 11,049 4,2 9,8 225 -77)
In•Jonesia 11.643 6,690 :l.5 7.2 1.9 15.8 .. -l2
!'.:?u,1 ::f:" Guinea 780 83 -137676 .. .. .. .. 
Burina 243 )1}9 -11.6 o.s -5.7 -4.6 
Nonl!l.3rket: 
China 10,680 11,950 . •• .. .. 
North Korea •• 950 •• 
Vtetn.?111 .. .. .. . .. 
C3:nbodia ••• ••• -3.3 -3.0 
136 
64 .. ..Laos 9
u.s.s.R. 52.216 50,550 .. 7.8 .. 10.2 
a: 1977. 
SourceB: Same as Table 1. 
• • •• • • 
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TABLES 
ASIAN- PACIFIC EOONOMIES IN WORLD TRADE ~.ATRIX, 1979 
(F.O.B. U.S. Dollars in l!illiono) 
I M P O R T E D B y 
South
Sul-total Korea Taiwan
e liong Konp.U.S.A. Canada Japan Australia New Zealand (1) 
EXPORTED BY: 
Developed 
3,617 530 54,822 4,191 3,070 2,083U.S.A. 33,096 17,579
3,501 484 79 41,716 312 120 121Canada 37,652 
2,587 581 31,340 6,201 4,153 J,652Japan 26,447 1,725 
Australia 2,220 352 5,197 ... 922 8,691 501 413 35469
New Zealand 721 105 629 584 ... 2,039 65 45 
7,272 2,112 138,608 _lJ., 270 7,H09 f,, 27'1Subtotal (1) 67,040 35,278 26,906 
Developing Market Economies 
24 8,314 161 SD4,393 388 3,352 157 
Taiwan
e 5,488 402 2,183 187
Hong Kong 4,144 355 1,026 423 71 
6,019 205 
Philippines 1,383 62 1,208 94 4 2,751 
141 67 1Sb 
S,rnth Korea 
407 28 8,508 166 I, 107 
49 67 255
Thailand 571 27 1,094 51 9 1,752 
Malaysia 1,873 75 2,644 188 79 4,859 
232 299 188 
221 4,030 217 113 '1/5Singapore 1, 81;6 122 1,392 449
7,189 190 51 10,629 384 411 99Indonesia 3,171 28 
Papua New Guinea ab 68 6 331 81 7 
493 6 5 
2,507 9 119 77Others and Unspecified• 452 12 1,862 115 66 






China 594 143 2,667 166 34 3,604 
6 
19
North Korea .. . 137 ... 13746 13 l S44 ... 1Vietnam 1
Camhodiaa ... ... ... 1 . 1
10 JLaos. 2 8 ... ... 29
USSR 822 54 1,723 65 7 2,671 
4 
232 42 6,469 23 2, 81 ll_Subtotal (3) 1,419 197 4,579 
91,848 36,952 53,766 9,659 2,714 194,939 12,702 9,238 
12,429
(1) + (2) + (3) 
1,543 171,449 5,639 4,:04 4,296ROWc 110,073 10,195 43,053 6,585 
TOTAL 201,921 47,147 96,819 16,244 4,257 
366,388 18,341 13,442 16, 72~ 
... .. ... ... 
TABLE 5 CONTINUED 
Page 2 
IMPORTED By 
Pa:,ua New · Otht!r and b Subtotiil Chin11Malaysia Singapore Indonesia (;~)______Philippines Thailand Guinea Unispec 1f ied 
EXPORTED RY: 
Developed 
981 33 191 16,351 l, 724U.S.A. 1,570 961 932 2,331 54 11 5 935 50775 76 60 101Canada 23,98) 1,671,2,660 2,110 122 278Japan 1,610 1,701 1,496 3,324 776
Australia 183 135 394 377 280 3
78 309
133 572 90
New Zealand 61 21 48 58 43 
29 
2,930 5,527 l.?468 573 916 ~-1!0_ !'-.!.~.?..!.Subtotal (1) 3,499 2,894 
Developing Market Economies 
195 2 16 1,413South Korea 114 112 83 197
410 387 3 23 2,597Taiwane 195 180 126 2,224 '.182
Hong Kong 270 173 155 642 379 19 
194
... 19 9 562 51Philippines 57 65 45 3 7 1,126 67... 235 427 276 ...Thailand 10 3 25 2, B6.5 ] ')41,829 23Malaysia 116 150 ... 124 98 347 4,439 11,8209 564 1,842 ...Singapore
Indonesia 165 37 66 1,951 ... 1 3,1 \/1 2014 37
Papua New Guinea 8 b 
7 ... ... 5 ... ... t,6<J
Others and Unspecified' 35 71 13 143 1 1 
... 
129 636 l2.!.Q46 862









1 7 20North Korea 1 7 47 NA




3 ... ... 8 NALaos ... 12 ...8 8 8 22 91 NAUSSR 
198 206 421 153 ... 88 ,,,026Subtotal (3) ill 
(1) + (2) + (3) 4,747 4,398 5,713 11,617 5,051 
702 1,640 68,237 7,6)3 
55 1,079 30,399 5, J:lJROWC 2,061 2,251 2,141 6,564 2,103 
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TABLE 5 OOfn'INUED 
Page 3 
I H l' 0 R T E D B y 
Subtotal (1 )+(2)+(]) ROWc Tl 1T/\L




Developed 76,506 tOS,292 181,7981 3,607 5,333
U.S.A. 1
 ... 646 1,173 t,3,824 14,)59 58, I83 1 19 61,848 1,0, 44 5 10:',29)Canada 1 9 2,443 6,525 
Japan 281 
117 
563 1,383 13,398 5,288 
1,",, 6JJ6 
Australia 21 
23 •.•• ... 196 286 2,897 l, li02 I+, n'J'J 
New Zealand ... 
10 7,455 14,700 ~-~.471 ~!.l~~ 
36 s_, r, ',9_ 
303 160 1Subtotal (1) 
Developing Market Economies 5,342 15,071... 1 . 1 2 9,729 4, S2'1 l 5, f,3/,l I, 105South ~orea ... 6,468 ! ~, 160Tai•,..an 1 10 449 8,69238 18 ... 3,449 1 , 12 7 1,, ':, 7633 136Hong Kong 
2 ... 2 ,0!,6 ., , 281,Ph I lippines 31 29 33 160 J,238 ~ ,.Q i'H 11 ,01,4442 8,166Thailand 
4 1 ... ... 243 4,565 11, 1,56Malaysia 
38 59 1 7 
169 422 8,891 
I, 781 15,579Sin~apore ... . 55 55 lJ, 798 3(,9 91920 550Indonesia 
b '1,976 
Others and Unspecified• ... 
594 1,686 70,5'14 29,Cl_)l. 1_0_~~~r I 
Papua New Guinea 8 
.
... ..... ... 81)8 ),784 
C
jSubtotal (2) -82 -110 -1 -37
 -
Nonmarket ... 7,429 4,)78 11,807--- NA NA NA NA NA l 92 620 812China NA NA NA 961'0rth Korea ... NA... 3 NA NA 3 439 
119
10NA 1Vietnam 
11 NA NA ... NA NA 18 19lCambodia 
NA NA NA ... NA 2,762 21,122 ~•J,H.'14taos NA ... ...
USSR NA NA 
NA 
3 . .. ... 3 10,1198 ~Q ~6,671 
Subtotal (3) ... ... 
47 8,0l9 16,389 279,565 
223,~72 502,837 
(1) + (2) + (3) 385 270 5
 
14 17,4i5 23,295 225,143 
BJl,520 1,05(,, 663 
cl
ROWC 184 483 
6 
61 25,524 39,684 504,708 1,05
4,792 1,5S9,500 
569 753 11TOTAL 
Notes:
Export data were derived from partner cou
ntry estimates,
a: 
Countries included are Brunei, Macao, F
iji, French Polynesia, Kiribati Rep., Gua
m, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Hebrides, S
nint Helenn, Americnn S,1moa, 
b: 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Western Samoa an
d other Pacific Ocean island countries, 
ROW (Rest of the World) does not include
 the Pacific non-market countries (China
, North Koren, USSR,.Vietnam, Cambodln, 
and I.nos) but includes tr11dc 
c: Trade among non-market economies is not 
included in ROW or world totnts. 
of European non-market economies with m
arket economies. 
The total amount is obtained by addin~ n
on-market countries' total exports to ma
rket economics plus Tniwan's exports to l
lOT total. 
d: 
Taiwan's dntn were tnken from ~•onthl1_S
tatjstles of_ Trade, Republic of China, Dec
ember 1979 !lir.ce DOT excluded its trade 
values from the 19RO Yt'.arhouk; 
e: f.o,h,/c.Lf, f11nor t>f 1,.07. 
Import valucti w1!ro. co11v1·rt1·d frPm c.l.f. 
tu I .o.h. 1,a::IH 11dn,; IFS
11:1 
Source:
IMF, lllrectl.on of 1'rndc Y<'nrhook, 1980, 
nhbn•vbtP<l ,w noT. 
Statistical Department, Hepulil.lc of Chin





UNITED STATES TRADE AS A SHARE OF GNP 
(in percent) 
EXPO R T s IMPORT s 
Goods Non- Goods 
Agri- Non-Agri- and Petroleum Petroleum and 
cultural cultural Services Products Goods Services 
1960 1.0 2.9 ·5.1 0.3 2.7 4.7 
1970 0.8 3.6 6.7 0.3 3.8 6.1 
5.0 9.41975 1.5 5.5 10.2 1.9 
6.2 12.1 2.5 6.4 11.91979 1.5 
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Survev of Current 
Business, June 1980 and earlier issues. 
